It is naive to assume that using the scientific method guarantees scientific progress. Although the scientific method is often characterized as an iterative, self-correcting process which leads to advances in knowledge, in practice this whiggish characterization of science does not necessarily hold true when accounting for the cognitive and behavioural biases of the people actually doing science.
Abstract The present experiment tested the effects of indirect implicit attitude change on performance on the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT is a subjective, indirect attitude measure widely used for business, research, and political purposes despite its unestablished construct validity and questionable reliability; thus, there is a growing need for research that identifies the cognitive mechanisms underlying IAT performance in order to assess its empirical value.
Abstract Despite its popular use in academia, business, and politics, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) continues to suffer from a number of fundamental issues that give challenge to the test’s empirical value. The present research manipulated the difficulty of the IAT by introducing a rest period between the test’s congruent and incongruent blocks, in order to identify how the IAT’s design influences a test-taker’s performance.
Abstract Snyder and Swann (1978) demonstrated that individuals systematically adopt confirmatory strategies and preferentially search for evidence that confirms existing beliefs. We suspect that Snyder and Swann’s results are an artifact of their methodology. In the present experiment, we replicated Snyder and Swann’s work, but had participants generate their own hypothesis testing questions instead of selecting questions from an existing list.
Abstract Social scientists have long known about the malleability of attitudes to persuasive communications. But what happens when changed attitudes transform into change-resilient beliefs? This review explores how confirmation bias, the tendency to search for, interpret, favour, and recall information in a way that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs can be caused and reinforced by narratives—termed here as narrative-driven confirmation bias.